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species-specific interaction to a general blueprint for robot action selection. We particularly emphasise the 11 integral role of emotions in facilitating social inter-action selection as social signals of internal agent states 12 that are relevant to joint action. 13 Our research questions concern the general abilities of artificial agents, particularly robots, to express 14 their current, transient internal states in ways that people find comprehensible and acceptable. This requires 15 that researchers consider not only the potential communicative value of a social signal but also the validity 16 or utility of the internal state which it describes. Were it the case that the role of the human was to correctly 17 identify a signal, as a passive observer of the robot, it would be a simple matter to construct a repertoire of 18 discriminable social actions. However, this leads us to an important issue in HRI research not emphasised by 19 FMS&G : the nature of interaction itself as a concept that requires simultaneous consideration of the actors 20 and the acted-upon. Dynamic selection decisions for emotional signalling must depend on considerations 21 that span human and robot: a question of emotional inter-action selection. Interaction differs from individual action in that it requires consideration of at least two entities: the actor 25 and the acted-upon. An action can be described uniquely (if rather unsatisfactorily) in terms of the behaviour 26 of a particular actor in isolation. An attempt to describe interaction in such a way is meaningless. Since the 27 Norman [16] Theory of Action, human-computer interactions are typically understood as a cycle of: goal-28 directed plan formulation based on an internal model of the effects of a particular action on an object or 29 system, execution of the plans, observation of the result, and reformulation. Reformulation may include 30 updating the agents internal model, alteration of the plan, or alteration of the internal model, and may be 31 conducted on-the-fly to compensate for low-level execution errors [15] . In the human case, the internal 32 model is typically referred to as a 'mental model' of a system with which a person interacts -a model 33 that encapsulates a person's own understanding of that system and their capabilities with respect to it.
34
As humans automatically ascribe agency to robots, any robot's signalling mechanism will naturally be 35 treated as indicative of its internal functioning, and human 'mental models' of the robot will be constructed 36 accordingly. As a result, a signalling system that is intended only to improve the superficial acceptability of 37 a robot will almost certainly not succeed. It is necessary to consider how one might engineer a meaningful 38 relationship between any robots internal state and the social signals it produces. tions John towards a café →Jane likes John and proposes that they eat together). In the case of social robots,
44
we can expect mental model generation to be facilitated by the human tendency to anthropomorphize any 45 system with uninspectable internal states. McCarthy [12] famously argued that more humanly manageable 46 interactions result from the ascription of mental qualities to machines, especially beliefs, knowledge, inten-47 tions, and wants. It is quite simply easier for people to understand machines in these terms than in terms 48 of their underlying architecture or functionality. Consequently, people routinely attribute affective states to 49 machines as part of a "social actor" strategy for informally modelling hidden processes [19] . Moreover,
50
people anticipate that such objects or agents will respond to them in emotional ways [4] . 51 
The Value of Emotions in Social Human-Robot Interaction

52
Emotions are not only key to reducing dithering and stabilising individual action selection [3] , but also joint 53 inter-action selection. As such, they are an important part of the embodiment necessary for social interaction 54 [5] . For the purpose of this commentary, we refer to emotional action selection as action selection based on We analyse these from a constructivist perspective [6] taking particular account of the role of emotions. 
Emotions in Cooperation
60
Cooperation is an important social skill, well developed in dogs and certainly useful to implement in social 61 robots. However, it would be difficult to associate cooperation with specific behavioural patterns. Rather 62 2 than looking for a specific personal behaviour which accompanies human-robot cooperation, it could be 63 more useful to focus on general facilitators of and influences on cooperation.
64
The persuasion approach to cooperation indicates that cooperation increases after the presentation of 65 persuasive messages [22] . Persuasion here is understood as a form of social influence [1] , a way to influ-66 ence people through communication without using force. In order to persuade it is necessary, among other 67 things, to induce or evoke affective states (whether moods, sentiments or emotions). Although effective 68 non-emotional verbal persuasion techniques certainly exist, non-verbal messages are of the greatest impor-69 tance in persuasion [13] , and the emotional component, in at least some conditions, has been shown to have 70 priority over the informational one [14] .
71
The topic of affective persuasion is addressed in many disciplines, including marketing, law, and pol-72 itics, as well as in daily life. However, little work is currently done on the role of emotions in influencing 73 human behaviour in the area of HRI [7] . 74 
Emotions in Communicating Personality and Individuality across Modalities
75
FMS&G claim that a behaviour of a dog wagging its tail can be considered as a part of a greeting behaviour,
76
"probably signalling the excitement". The authors also suggest using a general visual signal as "a functional [8], a cat's tail plays an important role in balance during locomotion [25] . Even in dogs, much is communi-82 cated by the height and stiffness of the tail as well as the rate and enthusiasm of its wagging [11] , and even 83 the direction of its wagging [24] . One very important function of tail wagging and many other gestures in 84 dogs is expression of dominance status. To humans they often express subordinate status, a fact that may understandable way using a variety of modalities at once -facial expressions (where a face is present)
92
[23], gestures [20] , sounds [18] , language [10] , colour, brightness, and even the overall shape of a robot [9] .
93
It is also possible that it is worth adding effectors for communicating emotion, as has been highly successful 94 with the ears of Kismet [2] . Such a multi-modal approach helps to make robots both more acceptable and 95 3 more understandable for people, and to make them appear more individual and independent, thus increasing 96 their life-likeness through emerging of a robots 'personality'.
97
In consideration of the results FMS&G present, it is also worth remembering first that dogs and owners 98 all have individual personality, and not every dog/owner coupling will be equally well suited. This will also 99 be a consideration for robotics: some owners will want more or less proactive, confident, open or attentive 100 robots. Second, dogs are cognitive systems. Some of their orientation behaviour will not be merely commu-101 nicative but also triggered by uncertainty in an unusual situation and the need to gather more information.
102
But in closely-coupled agents, every action is also an interaction, so it is not surprising that these functional 103 gestures are perceived as, and therefore serve as, communicative acts as well. human affect [23] , though we have also explored discrete representations [3] . There are many possible ways 114 to construct such internal state, given a range of sensor input, goal structure and action feedback; our current 115 approach is to change the state dynamically such that it feeds back into the computation of subsequent levels 116 of intensity, treating robot emotion as a latched process that is tied in to its external expression [21] . The 117 key idea following on from the commentary above is that for robot emotion to function effectively in human 118 interactions, it is necessary to consider the internal relevance of the emotional state for the robots operation 119 so that intelligible mappings can be made to a set of signals for the robots human partner. Without this step, 120 the social epithet not only has little meaning but emotion is also unlikely to serve interactions well. 
Conclusions
122
For robot behaviour to be understandable to people, it must be designed to facilitate the progressive con- 
127
The personal history of an individual with a robot means that each mental model is likely to be unique. give rise to unrealistic mental models, they are likely to result in rejection or worse. 
